COMMENT
CHALLENGES TO THE VERACITY
OF FACIALLY SUFFICIENT WARRANTSIS THE TRUTH RELEVANT?
Evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant and subsequently sought to be used in a criminal prosecution is subject to a suppression motion based upon the fourth amendment command that
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
While suppression motions may be based upon a number of grounds,
frequently the claim is that the warrant did not issue upon a showing
of probable cause as required by the fourth amendment. 2 Where
1U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) the
Supreme Court held that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment could
not be used in a federal criminal trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), mandated the extension of the exclusionary rule to state criminal prosecutions through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. '23 (1963), a case involving a warrantless search, the
Supreme Court held that the standards applied in determing the validity of a search are
"the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 33. But the Court
emphasized that the application of federal constitutional standards to the states did not
preclude them
from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures . . .
provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant command that evidence
so seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to complain.
Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
The recent case of Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), evidences an inclination
to grant the states more leeway in fashioning such "workable rules." The Court, speaking through Justice Powell, held that state court defendants' claims under the fourth
amendment may not be the basis for the grant of habeas corpus relief by a federal court
"where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim." Id. at 3045-46. The decision effectuates a significant cutback on
federal courts' review of state search and seizure procedures and will be discussed at a
number of pertinent points in this Comment.
2 Probable cause sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant exists where there
are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that evidence of
that crime may be found at the particular place to be searched. See, e.g., United States
v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971); United States v. Neal, 500 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir.
1974). The determination that probable cause exists must be made by an objective
magistrate, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111-15 (1964); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); and must be based upon the information put before him, Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
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such a claim is made the court must determine whether the search
warrant, together with any accompanying affidavits, sets forth sufficient grounds to support the finding of probable cause by the issuing
3
authority.
In the past, such review was limited to an examination of the
facial sufficiency of the warrant and affidavits, and challenges to the
4
truth of the underlying facts averred therein were not entertained.
Increasingly in the past decade, however, both federal and state
courts have reexamined this rule. 5 In cases involving affidavits sworn
out by federal law enforcement agents and police, officers, evidence
has been suppressed where the affiant is shown to have misstated the
6
facts.
3 The role of the reviewing court at a suppression hearing was discussed in Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The Court said that the judge must determine whether
the search warrant contains allegations of facts or circumstances, rather than conclusory
statements, such that the issuing magistrate could make an independent assessment as
to the existence of probable cause. Id. at 112-13. As to the warrant at issue in Aguilar,
the Court said:
For all that appears, the source here merely suspected, believed or concluded
that there were narcotics in petitioner's possession. The magistrate here certainly could not "judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on ...
to show probable cause." He necessarily accepted "without question" the
informant's "suspicion," "belief" or "mere conclusion."
Id. at 113-14 (footnote omitted).
The issuance of search warrants in the federal courts is governed by FED. R. CRIm.
P. 41. For a recent survey of state law provisions relating to the issuance and execu-

tion of search warrants see ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§§ 210.1-.3, 220.1-.5, Commentary at 499-517 (Proposed Official Draft, April 15, 1975).
4 See, e.g., Kenney v. United States, 157 F.2d 442, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1946); United
States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219, 225 (W.D. Mo. 1931); Smith v. State, 191 Md. 329,
334-36, 62 A.2d 287, 289-90 (1948); Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 553, 399 S.W.2d
507, 511 (1965).
5 There has been considerable commentary on the subject of veracity challenges to
search warrants. See, e.g., Forkosh, The Constitutional Right to Challenge the Content
of Affidavits in Warrants Issued Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 OHIO S.L.J. 297
(1973); Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants and
the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405; Herman, Warrants for Arrest
or Search: Impeaching the Allegations of a Facially Sufficient Affidavit, 36 OHIO
S.L.J. 721 (1975); Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for
Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARv. L. REV. 824 (1971); Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of Affidavits for Search Warrants: Piercing the Presumption of Validity, 44
CONN. B.J. 9 (1970); Comment, Controverting Probable Cause in Facially Sufficient
Affidavits, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 41 (1972); Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient
Search Warrant Affidavit: What If It's False?, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 96 (1971); Note,
Search Warrant Affidavits-The Constitutional Constraints, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 623

(1974).
6 The leading circuit courts of appeals cases involving veracity challenges in federal
criminal prosecutions are listed at notes 10-11 infra. The most current state cases are
compiled at notes 92-95 infra.
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The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed
the question of whether a defendant must be allowed to challenge the
accuracy of an affidavit, 7 although dicta in United States v. Rugendorf 8 can be interpreted as implying that the veracity of affidavit
statements should be open to inquiry on a motion to suppress. 9 Almost all of the circuit courts either expressly have held that warrants
containing false statements are invalid under given circumstances 10 or
"Misstatement" will be used in this Comment interchangeably with the phrases
erroneous statement," "untruthful statement," and "false statement." Unless otherwise
specified, these phrases are not meant to imply that the affiant made the statement in
question with knowledge of its inaccuracy.
7 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a series of cases which have presented the issue. See North Carolina v. Wrenn, 417 U.S. 973 (1974) (Burger, C.J. &
White, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 486 F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1973) (mem.); Petillo v.
New Jersey, 410 U.S. 945 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 61 N.J. 165,
293 A.2d 649 (1972); Anselmo v. Lousiana, 407 U.S. 911 (1972), denying cert. to 260 La.
306, 256 So. 2d 98 (1971); Upshaw v. United States, 405 U.S. 934 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971); Bak v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 882
(Brennan & White, JJ., dissenting), denying cert. to 42 I11. 2d 140, 258 N.E.2d 341
(1970); Dunnings v. United States, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970), denying cert. to 425 F.2d 836
(2d Cir. 1969); Tucker v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967), denying cert. to 244 Md. 488,
224 A.2d 111 (1966).
8 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
' Rugendorf was convicted in federal court on a charge of possession of stolen goods
transported in interstate commerce. A warrant search of his home had yielded a large
amount of stolen property. The warrant was issued pursuant to an affidavit sworn out by
an F.B.I. agent who relied on information supplied by other federal agents and by a
confidential informant. The defendant's motion to suppress, based in part on alleged
factual inaccuracies in the search warrant, was denied by the trial court. Id. at 529-31.
In upholding the validity of the search on appeal, the Supreme Court said:
This Court has never passed directly on the extent to which a court may permit
such examination when the search warrant is valid on its face and when the
allegations of the underlying affidavit establish "probable cause"; however, assuming, for the purpose of this decision, that such attack may be made, we are
of the opinion that the search warrant here is valid.
Id. at 531-32. The Court concluded that although the warrant did contain some "factual
inaccuracies," they "were of only peripheral relevancy . . . and, not being within the
personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go to the integrity of the affidavit." Id. at 532.
Furthermore, it was noted that the defendant had "fail[ed] to show that the affiant was
in bad faith or that he made any misrepresentations to the Commissioner in securing
the warrant." Id. at 533.
10 United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Gonzalez, 488 F.2d 833, 837-38 (2d Cir. 1973) (by implication); United States v. Pond, 523
F.2d 210, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1975) (by implication), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976);
United State v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844
(1975); United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4, 8 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965
(1976); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 988-89 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc);
United States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897, 899-900 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827
(1974); United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50, 54 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322, 324 (10th Cir. 1972).
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have indicated strongly that they will so hold when the issue is
squarely presented." The state courts are not uniform in their resolution of the issue, although an increasing number have excluded
evidence where a warrant is shown to contain inaccurate statements. 12
The question of whether the Constitution mandates that evidence seized pursuant to an inaccurate warrant be suppressed is an
open one. The federal circuit courts have not clearly stated whether
their decisions allowing such challenges are constitutionally based or
merely represent an exercise of their supervisory powers over the
lower federal courts. 13 However, two federal district courts have
granted habeas corpus petitions brought by state defendants who unsuccessfully sought to suppress evidence upon a claim of affidavit
inaccuracy.1 4 In one of these cases, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, with Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissenting.15 Justice White urged that the time had come for the Court
to speak on the constitutional issue, " 'for the courts are in conflict
and the question is important to the proper administration of criminal justice.' "16
11 United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 40-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
858 (1975). See also King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398, 400-01 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1960)
(invalidating warrant where an affiant falsely identified herself).
There has apparently been no expression of opinion on the veracity issue in the
Fourth Circuit subsequent to that in King v. United States, supra. However, in 1973 the
court summarily affirmed the action of a district court in granting a state defendant's
habeas corpus petition where his claim was. based on the failure of the state court to
allow a veracity challenge. See Wrenn v. North Carolina, 486 F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1973)
(mem.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 973 (1974).
12 For discussion of the state court cases see notes 91-119 infra and accompanying
text.
13 In United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 988 n.13 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc),
one of the leading circuit cases, the court stated that its holding was "not based on
constitutional grounds." For a discussion of this case see notes 23-41 infra and accompanying text.
14 Wrenn v. North Carolina, No. 3040 Civil (E.D.N.C., Aug. 10, 1972) (further discussed in note 15 infra); United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 400 F. Supp. 1152
(D.N.J. 1975), vacated and remanded, 541 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.), original decision reinstated and writs of habeas corpus granted, 418 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1976) (discussed at
notes 112-27 infra and accompanying text).
15 North Carolina v. Wrenn, 417 U.S. 973 (1974), denying cert. to 486 F.2d 1399 (4th
Cir. 1973) (mem.). The circuit court disposition of this case was a per curiam affirmance
of the district court's unreported opinion. Wrenn had previously pressed his claim on the
issue of the invalidity of the search warrant in the North Carolina courts, where his conviction was upheld in State v. Wrenn, 12 N.C. App. 146, 182 S.E.2d 600, appeal dismissed, 279 N.C. 620, 184 S.E.2d 113 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
16 North Carolina v. Wrenn, 417 U.S. 973, 976 (1974) (quoting from Kipperman,
supra note 5, at 825).
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THE FEDERAL COURTS

As indicated above, the federal courts have determined almost
uniformly that a defendant may challenge the accuracy of affidavit
statements on a motion to suppress. 17 There is as yet no consensus

on a number of related issues; the courts disagree as to when a defendant is entitled to a hearing on allegations of inaccuracy, 18 what
the burden of proof is at such a hearing, 19 and whether or not the
statements of informers may be challenged. 20 The issue that has received the most attention is the determination of what kind and degree of inaccuracy must be shown to suppress evidence.
In the circuit cases allowing veracity challenges, three different
standards have thus far developed to govern the suppression of evidence once inaccuracies have been shown. Each of the suppression
standards involves a consideration of two factors-the subjective fac2
tual issue of the affiant's intent in making the erroneous statements '

The Kipperman article has been highly influential on those courts, especially federal courts, which have held that veracity challenges should be permitted. Relying
primarily on the Supreme Court's language in Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435,
441 (1925), and subsequent court of appeals precedents, Kipperman concluded that evidence should be excluded "only when" an error in a warrant "results from an act or
omission by a government agent which is objectionable in light of the purpose of the
fourth amendment." Kipperman, supra at 831. Under the standards suggested in the
article, evidence would be excluded where the warrant pursuant to which it was obtained contains any intentional misstatement or any material misstatement if made negligently. Id. at 831-32. Compare id. with the standards explicated in the various federal
circuit courts at notes 23-79 infra and accompanying text.
17 See notes 10-11 supra. For the most part, the definitive federal cases on point are
relatively recent. There are a number of earlier federal cases, however, which dealt
briefly with the permissibility of veracity challenges and the exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to erroneous warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d
1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Bridges,
419 F.2d 963, 966-67 n.4 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236, 241
(6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966); United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318,
321-22 (7th Cir. 1960).
18 See notes 81-90 infra.
'9 See note 119 infra.
20 For discussion of the use of informers' statements in warrants see note 24 infra
and notes 128-32 infra and accompanying text.
In many of the cases, both federal and state, involving veracity challenges, the warrants in question contained statements by informants. See, e.g., United States v. Luciow,
518 F.2d 298, 299-300 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 986
(7th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Ramos, 380 F.2d 717, 719 (2d Cir.
1967); People v. Bak, 45 I11. 2d 140, 141, 258 N.E.2d 341, 342, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
882 (1970); State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 169, 293 A.2d 649, 651 (1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 945 (1973).
21 Most cases involving affidavit errors have been concerned only with distinguishing between intentional and non-intentional errors. It has been recognized, however,
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and the objective legal issue of the error's materiality.22
The leading circuit case establishing suppression standards is the
Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Carmichael.23 Carmichael involved an affidavit sworn out by a secret service agent who
based his statements on information received from an unnamed
informant. 2 4 The agent made the requisite recitals of his reasons for
believing that the informer was credible and reliable, including a
statement that information previously supplied by the informant had
resulted in six convictions. 2 5 The warrant was issued, evidence was
seized, and a criminal prosecution resulted. 2 6 At a hearing in the
district court on a motion to suppress the seized evidence, defense
counsel attempted to question the agent-affiant about his allegations
of the informer's past reliability. 2 7 The defense asserted that answers
to its questions would show that the informer in question had never
given information resulting in arrests or convictions. 28 However, govthat there is another category-negligent, or reckless errors-that is much more difficult
to deal with. See United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58, 60-62 (1st Cir. 1974); United
States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 671 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975);
Kipperman, supra note 5, at 831-32. In Carmichael v. United States, 489 F.2d 983,
988-89 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc), the Seventh Circuit distinguished further between
merely negligent errors and reckless errors, although the court did not establish any
criteria for differentiating between the two.
22 The materiality of an error in a warrant is a question of whether the erroneous
fact is essential to the Warrant's showing of probable cause. But see notes 68-71 infra
and accompanying text. The method for determining materiality that has been utilized
by most courts is that stated in United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975), wherein the court described the process as
"excising the misrepresentative parts from the affidavit and then examining the residue
for probable cause." For a discussion of the Thomas case and the Fifth Circuit precedents it relied on see note 46 infra.
23 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc). The defendant was appealing from a conviction in federal court on charges of possession of checks stolen from the mails. Id. at
985.
24 Id. at 984.
25 Id. The issuance of a search warrant on the basis of an informant's tip must satisfy
the requirements set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1964), and reiterated in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-13, 415-16 (1969), that an affidavit
based on such information set forth sufficient additional "underlying circumstances" to
corroborate the informant's assertions and contain facts from which the magistrate may
make a determination as to the informant's credibility and reliability.
26 489 F.2d at 984-85. It should be noted that Carmichael involved an arrest warrant, and the evidence sought to be suppressed was seized at the time of the arrest. Id.
at 985.
27 Id. at 987. The matters that defense counsel attempted to inquire into included the
identity of the six persons whose convictions has supposedly resulted from information
previously supplied by the same informant, the length and nature of the agent's relationship with the informant, and the informant's criminal record. Id.
28 Id. The identity of the informant was revealed at the suppression hearing. Id. at
984 n. 1.
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ernment objections to those inquiries were sustained, and the motion
29
to suppress was ultimately denied.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated Carmichael's conviction and remanded the case to the district court for a
further hearing on the issue of the informer's reliability. 30 The court
said that the defendant was entitled to a further hearing because
there had been a "threshold showing" that the agent's affidavit was
untruthful 3 ' and because the hearing in the trial court "was too
circumscribed.- 32 The court then announced standards to be followed
by the district court in determining whether or not to suppress evidence if the hearing showed that the affidavit in question was in fact
inaccurate. It was held that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant should be suppressed where the defendant shows that a government agent has made any intentional misstatement or has made a
reckless misstatement with regard to a material element of a
warrant. 3 3 The standards were expressly limited, however, to testing
statements within the personal knowledge of government affiants and
were not extended to allow inquiry into the hearsay statements of
34
confidential informants .

29 Id. at 987-88. The government objected to the relevance of the questions. The
defense relied on Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (discussed in note 25
supra), in claiming a right to cross-examine the agent on his allegations as to the
informer's reliability. 489 F.2d at 987.
30 489 F.2d at 990.
31 Id. at 989. The court declared that
a defendant is entitled to a hearing which delves below the surface of a facially
sufficient affidavit if he has made an initial showing of either of the following:
(1) any misrepresentation by the government agent of a material fact, or (2) an
intentional misrepresentation by the government agent, whether or not material.
Id. at 988. The court concluded that the defendant, by his offer of proof at the suppression hearing combined with further information adduced at trial, had made the required
showing. Id. at 989. The court also noted that, in the future, an assertion of falsity in a
search warrant affidavit should be supported by an affidavit. Id.
32 Id. at 990.
33 Id. at 988-89.
34 Id. at 989. The court stated that the Aguilar requirement that a police officeraffiant make positive allegations of his basis for believing the confidential informant
sufficiently tests the credibility of confidential informers. Consequently, defendant may not challenge the truth of hearsay evidence reported by an affiant.
He may, after a proper showing, challenge any statements based on the affiant's
personal knowledge, including his representations concerning the informer's reliability, his representation that the hearsay statements were actually made, and
his implied representation that he believes the hearsay to be true. This fills the
gap not covered by the Aguilar tests ....
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The suppression standards enunciated in Carmichae3 5 are predicated on the assumption that exclusion of evidence in a criminal prosecution has a deterrent effect on certain kinds of police conduct. 36
Therefore, the nature of the government affiant's intent in making the
inaccurate statements is highly determinative of whether evidence
will be suppressed. Under the Carmichael formulation, good faith errors will not vitiate a warrant, whereas the presence of any intentional error will result in suppression. 37 The court reasoned that innocent mistakes cannot be deterred and that the presence of such
errors in a warrant "do[es] not negate probable cause."3 8 However,
any perjurious statement in a warrant is such grievous misconduct

that "[t]he fullest deterrent sanctions of the exclusionary rule should
39
be applied."
Negligent conduct presented a more difficult challenge for the
Carmichael court in formulating its standards. The court concluded
that while negligent conduct by government officials is deterrable in
theory, in practice "no workable test suggests itself for determining
whether an officer was negligent or completely innocent in not checking his facts further." 40 Thus the Carmichael standards require more
than a merely negligent error to invalidate a warrant. The affiant
must be "at least reckless in his misrepresentation" and, furthermore,
the inaccuracy must be material to the showing of probable cause. 4 1
35 In formulating its standards, the Carmichael court relied upon the analysis advanced in the Kipperman article, but modified somewhat the standards enunciated
therein. Kipperman suggested that evidence be suppressed where the affidavit contained (1) any perjured statement, regardless of its materiality, or (2) any "negligent or
unreasonable" misstatement material to prQbable cause. Kipperman, supra note 5, at
831-32. The Carmichael court concluded that mere negligence should not be the basis
for suppression of evidence and that the police officer's conduct must be "at least reckless." 489 F.2d at 989. See text accompanying notes 40-41 infra.
3' See 489 F.2d at 988-89. On the question of whether the exclusionary rule has any
appreciable effect on police conduct see Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3051 & n.32
(1976) (majority opinion); id. at 3054 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
37 489 F.2d at 988-89.
38 Id. The court said that
[i]f an agent reasonably believes facts which on their face indicate that a crime
has probably been committed, then even if mistaken, he has probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed.
Id. at 989.
39 Id.
40 Id.

41 Id. The Carmichael court failed to define "recklessness," leaving the term open
to interpretations that might encompass a wide variety of police conduct. Furthermore,
there appears to be no sound basis for concluding that it is easier to distinguish between negligence and recklessness than it is to distinguish between negligence and
mere mistake. See Herman, supra note 5, at 747-48. It would seem that a more appro-
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A more stringent standard was applied to affidavits of government agents by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Thomas. 42 In
that case a government narcotics agent's affidavit referred to the defendant Thomas by the wrong name, an error which became apparent
after the execution of the warrant. 43 The trial court found the error
"trivial and insignificant" and declined to consider the issue further, 4"
but the Fifth Circuit, in reviewing Thomas's conviction, scrutinized
the error more closely.
Stating the principle that a warrant containing any material error
is invalid, 45 the Thomas court looked to three prior Fifth Circuit
cases which dealt with inaccurate warrants. In each of these cases,
the court had determined the materiality of any erroneous statements
by excising them from the warrant, then reevaluating the remaining
statements to determine if they were sufficient to establish probable
cause. 4 6 Adopting this procedure, the Thomas court concluded that
priate basis for distinguishing between recklessness and negligence would be to simply
say that reckless police conduct, whatever the definition, is more culpable than negligent police conduct and thus more deserving of sanction.
42 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975).
43 489 F.2d at 665-67. The narcotics agent received information from confidential informants regarding narcotics trafficking by a man referred to by the informants as "Tee"
The narcotics agent observed an individual who fit the informants' discription of "Tee"
arriving at a location in a car. The agent traced the license plate and discovered that it
was registered to one "Finley" and identified the individual he observed by that in his
affidavit. Id.
44 Id. at 667. The Fifth Circuit noted that "[t]he trial court found that [the agent]
maintained a good faith belief based upon his investigation that 'Tee' was in reality a
man named 'Finley.' " Id.
45 Id. at 669.

46 Id. at 667-68. In United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972), the search warrant at issue contained statements by a government agent relying on an informant. Both the informant and the affiant testified at
the suppression hearing and, upon examination, indicated that their positive statements
of fact were actually based on belief and suspicion. 448 F.2d at 1220-21. The circuit court
reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, stating:
Once it came to the attention of the court, from the testimony at the motion
to suppress hearing, that evidence had been seized on the basis of statements of
facts erroneously made by the affiant which struck at the heart of the affidavit's showing of probable cause, the court was required to grant the motion.
Id. at 1222 (emphasis added). Since the misrepresentation in the warrant affidavit came
to light as an incident to the suppression hearing, the Upshaw court did not address the
issue of what "preliminary requirements" a defendant must meet in order to be granted
a hearing to test the veracity of warrant statements. Id. at 1221-22 & n.3.
In United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 725-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841
(1973), and United.States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657, 662 & n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 852 (1973), the veracity issue arose in a manner similar to Upshaw, where the suppression hearing testimony of government agents differed from their sworn affidavit
statements, and the issue of when a hearing would be required was not addressed.
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the narcotics agent's error was not material. 4 7 The court then undertook to confront an issue not addressed in prior cases: the question of
whether a misstatement made "with an intent to deceive" could vitiate a warrant even if the misstatement was not material in establishing probable cause. 4 8 Relying in part on United States v. Carmichael,
the Thomas court held that a judge need not consider materiality
when he finds that any misstatement was made "with intent to deceive the magistrate." 4 9 The Thomas court agreed with the conclusion
of the Carmichael court that the presence of any deliberate falsehood,
regardless of its importance, would so taint the remainder of the warrant that the evidence obtained must be suppressed. 50 In this case,
however, the narcotics agent's error was deemed unintentional as
well as immaterial; therefore, the warrant was upheld. 5 '
The standards formulated by the Fifth Circuit place a much
heavier burden of accuracy on the affidavit statements of government
officials than do the standards in Carmichael. Although both circuits
invalidate a warrant containing any intentional misstatements, the
Thomas court would also invalidate where any material misstatement
52
is found, even if the misstatement is not intentional.
It should also be noted that none of the three cases discussed the errors in terms of
whether they were intentional or unintentional but disposed of the issue solely upon
the grounds of materiality. The Morris court did, however, make note of the fact that the
agent's misstatement was apparently not "intentionally or wilfully made." United States
v. Morris, supra at 662 n.6.
47489 F.2d at 668.
48 Id. at 668-69. It should be noted that it was not necessary for the court to reach
this issue. See note 51 infra.
49 489 F.2d at 669. The Thomas court also referred to the reasoning in Kipperman,
supra note 5, at 831, to the effect that use of a perjured warrant could be analogized to
the use of perjured trial testimony. 489 F.2d at 671. The questionable validity of this
comparison is discussed at note 115 infra.
50489 F.2d at 668-71.
51Id. at 672. The Thomas court seemed determined to address the issue of how
intentional errors should be treated, even though it was actually unnecessary to decide
the question. The court could have decided the case by first determining that the
agent's error was not intentional. Having so found, it would have been unnecessary to
reach the issue of whether an intentional error should invalidate a warrant.
52 Id. at 669. The court added a confusing footnote, in which it stated:
[W]e do not reach the question of what degrees of unintentional misrepresentations, i.e., reckless or negligent or innocent, are necessary to invalidate an affidavit, since in any event the error in the instant case was immaterial.
Id. at 671 n.5. According to the Thomas court's announced standards, see notes 48-52
supra and accompanying text, the question of recklessness or negligence could only
come into play when the error is found to be immaterial. The only possibility not addressed by the Thomas court's standards is whether negligence or recklessness could be
the basis for exclusion even though an error is not material. If this is the proper interpretation of the court's ambiguous statement, then the Fifth Circuit seems inclined to
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A third standard, formulated by the First Circuit in United
States v. Belculfine, 5 3 seems at first to place a lesser burden of accuracy on the government than the Fifth and Seventh Circuit
55
standards. 5 4 Analyzing the tests of Thomas and Carmichael, the
Belculfine court concluded that a motion to suppress should be
granted where a warrant contains "an intentional, relevant, and nontrivial misstatement." 56 Translated into the terminology of the
Thomas and Carmichael decisions, the Belculfine court would invalidate a warrant only where an erroneous statement is both intentional
57
and material.
In Belculfine, the court reviewed photographs and testimony
brought forward by the defense at a suppression hearing. 58 The defendant sought to show that the postal inspectors who swore out a
search warrant could not have been telling the truth when they
claimed to have seen certain incriminating evidence on the
defendant's premises. 59 According to the First Circuit, the evidence
60
but the
established "conclusively" that the affidavit was erroneous,
place yet a greater burden on government officials to be accurate in their affidavit assertion, a burden which would approach an absolute requirement of accuracy regardless of
materiality.
53508 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1974), noted in 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1485 (1975).
54But see notes 68-70 infra and accompanying text.
,5508 F.2d at 60-61 & n. 3-5.
-6Id. at 63.
57
Id.
58 See id. at 60, 62 & n.7.
59Id. at 60. The defendant Belculfine was convicted of mailing a home-made pipe
bomb which exploded in a Boston post office. The package containing the bomb was
addressed to the Worcester Music Company, the defendant's former employer. Postal
inspectors were told by Worcester company officials that the defendant possessed the
requisite knowledge to construct the type of bomb involved and that the defendant
probably had a workshop equipped to construct such a device. Id. at 59. Subsequently,
the postal inspectors went to the defendant's business premises where they made observations through a glass window. Id. at 60. Having subsequently received further evidence incriminating the defendant, the inspectors swore out affidavits before a federal
magistrate. In the affidavit the postal inspectors asserted that while they were at
defendant's business premises they " 'observed a wooden bench and table' " through
the window. Id. at 59-60. Presumably the significance of this observation was that a
bomb could have been assembled at such a workbench. See id. at 59, 62. Pursuant to
the warrant, the postal inspectors searched the premises and found "strands of wire
the construction of the bomb in question." Id. at 60.
similar to that used in
7
60 Id. at 62 & n. . According to the circuit court, photographic evidence introduced
by the defense showed that it was physically impossible to observe the workbench on
the premises through any window. Id. at 62. On remand, however, the district court
found otherwise. See United States v. Belculfine, 395 F. Supp. 7, 8 (D. Mass. 1975). The
district court took further sworn testimony and visited the actual premises of the Bell
Music Company. Contrary to the findings of the circuit court, the district court concluded that the postal inspectors' affidavit statements were not inaccurate. Id. Question-
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erroneous statements were found to be immaterial under the
Carmichael court's use of that term, i.e., in the Belculfine court's
words, they were not a " 'but for essential' of probable cause." 6 1 Although the Belculfine court's concluded that the statements were not
material it nonetheless found them to be "relevant, and non-trivial";
therefore, in the court's view the statements "may have carried great
weight with the magistrate." 62 Concluding that such significant
statements should be further scrutinized in order to ascertain the affiants' intent, the appeals court remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether "the misstatements . . . were knowingly

made. "63
In enunciating standards to guide the district court, the Belculfine court added that it would also apply an exclusionary sanction
in cases where misstatements were made "merely . . . to 'round out

the picture.' "64 The Belculfine court expressly declined to discuss
whether suppression would be appropriate upon a showing of negligent misstatement because they were uncertain that there would be
any deterrent effect in such cases. 6 5 Nevertheless, the court's reference to statements made "to 'round out the picture' " can be interpreted as an attempt to deal with reckless misstatements. 6 6 Thus, as
to the element of intent, the Carmichael and Belculfine standards
67
appear to overlap.
ing whether it was bound by the circuit court's contrary findings of fact on the accuracy
issue, the district court found that "if [the inspectors] did in fact communicate inaccurate information to the magistrate, [they] did not do so intentionally, wilfully or knowingly." Id. at 9.
61 508 F.2d at 61 n.3, 62. The court indicated that in its opinion the postal inspectors'
observation of the workbench may have influenced the magistrate's decision to issue
the warrant because it provided independent support for, and strengthened the credibility of, the other elements in the warrant. The court concluded that "[i]t changed a
marginally adequate affidavit into a solidly persuasive one." Id. at 62.
62 Id.

63 Id. at 63.
64

id.
65 Id. at 61-62.
66 See id. at 63. The court said:
We see no basis for confining this sanction to false statements made with the
specific intent to deceive the magistrate as opposed to false statements merely
intended to "round out the picture".
Id.
67 See 489 F.2d at 989. The Carmichael court failed to elaborate on what type of
government conduct would be considered reckless. See id. However, some discussion of
the "recklessness" concept was undertaken in United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4, 8-9
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976), where the Sixth Circuit adopted standards identical to those that had been set out in Carmichael, 489 F.2d at 987-89. The
Luna court indicated that a reckless statement is one which the affiant makes without
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With regard to the element of materiality, the Belculfine court's
concept is more expansive than that of the other two circuits. The
Belculfine court would not limit scrutiny to material misstatements in
the Carmichael and Thomas courts' meaning of the term, i.e., statements essential to establishing probable cause. 68 Rather, in determining whether a warrant should be invalidated, the Belculfine court
would also consider "relevant, and nontrivial misstatement[s], 6 9
which, while not necessary for establishing probable cause, were
70
nevertheless "persuasive" or "significant" in that determination.
Thus it would appear that the Belculfine court would invalidate a
warrant upon a showing of a lesser degree of inaccuracy than would
71
be required under the Carmichael standards.
The Carmichael, Thomas, and Belculfine courts agreed that a
showing of intentional misrepresentation on the part of a federal
agent renders a search warrant invalid. 72 The underlying assumption
reasonable grounds for believing that it is true, saying that
[i]n alleging recklessness, the movant must offer affidavits 1) that the statement
sought to be attacked was false when made, and 2) that when made the affiant
did not have reasonable grounds for believing it. At a hearing on such a charge,
it will be important for the District Judge to determine whether means had
been available to the agent to establish the truth or falsity of the statement
without such delay as would defeat a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
525 F.2d at 8-9.
68 508 F.2d at 62. The Belculfine court specifically adopted the Seventh Circuit's
definition of "material." Id. at 61 n.3.
19 Id. at 63. In discussing the concept of materiality, the Belculfine court referred to
the general federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970). 508 F.2d at 62. Under this
statute, a person is guilty of perjury where he, under oath, "willfully" testifies to "any
material matter which he does not believe to be true." 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970). The
court noted that the term "material" in the statute has been construed in its "broader
sense of relevant or persuasive." 508 F.2d at 62 n.8. The Belculfine court saw "no policy reason" for not applying an exclusionary sanction to a warrant containing false
statements which could subject the affiant to perjury prosecution under section 1621.
508 F.2d at 62.
70 508 F.2d at 62. The court concluded that
[a] knowing misstatement of so significant a fact would exhibit exactly that
quality of unscrupled zeal which impelled the adoption of the exclusionary
rule.

Id.
71 While it is true that under the Carmichael standards an intentional misstatement
would invalidate a warrant regardless of any degree of materiality, a reckless misstatement would provide grounds for invalidity only if it were material. See 489 F.2d at 989.
If it is correct to conclude that the Belculfine court's standard encompass recklessness,
see notes 54-66 supra and accompanying text, then a warrant would be invalidated in
the First Circuit if it were based upon an affidavit containing reckless misstatements
which were merely "relevant, and nontrivial" but not a necessary element in establishing probable cause. See 508 F.2d at 62-63.
72 As previously pointed out, the Carmichael and Thomas courts would invalidate a
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of this position is that such conduct is deterrable by applying the
sanction of the exclusionary rule. 73 But even if one accepts the
hypothesis that the exclusionary rule has a significant effect on, intentional conduct, 74 it is difficult to support the contention that exclusion
would have an effect on good faith conduct. As the Carmichael court
pointed out, "the primary justification for the exclusionary rule is to
deter police misconduct . . . , and good faith errors cannot be deterred." 75 Therefore, the invalidation of warrants because of unintentional (although material) errors, a result dictated by the Thomas
standards, 76 seems to be an ill-conceived application of the exclusionary remedy unless it can be rationalized on a theory other than
77
deterrence.
The cases decided thus far in the circuit courts have by no
means stabilized the state of the law on the scope of veracity challenges, although two more circuits have followed the lead of the
Carmichael court. 78 And the Fifth Circuit in Thomas and the First
Circuit in Belculfine left open the question, answered by the
Carmichael court, of how to deal with reckless or negligent misstatements. 79 Therefore, the standards enunciated in these two cases
warrant upon a showing of intentional misstatement, even if the misstatement was not
material. 489 F.2d at 989; 489 F.2d at 671. The Belculfine court would vitiate a warrant
containing an intentional misstatement only if it was at least "relevant, and nontrivial."
508 F.2d at 63.
73 See United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d at 989; United States v. Thomas, 489
F.2d at 668.
Another rationale has been expounded by a federal district court in United States ex
rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 400 F. Supp. 1152, 1179 (D.N.J. 1975), where the court referred to the use of a perjured warrant as an affront to the court's integrity. For a discussion of this basis for suppressing evidence see note 123 infra.
74 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has been widely questioned, most recently
by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), where Justice Powell
acknowledged "the absence of supportive empirical evidence" to show that exclusion
actually operates to deter violations of the fourth amendment, id. at 3051 (footnote ommitted), and see id. n.32.
75 489 F.2d at 988 (citation omitted).
76 489 F.2d at 669.
77 Such a theory has been advanced in commentary and in court decisions in this
area. See notes 134-35 infra.
78 In United States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897, 900 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
827 (1974), noted in 8 iND. L. REV. 738 (1975), the Eighth Circuit expressly adopted the
Carmichael suppression standards, and in United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4, 8-9 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976), the Sixth Circuit adopted an identical
formulation. Compare United States v. Luna, supra at 8, with United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d at 988-89.
79 The Carmichael court would vitiate a warrant containing material, reckless misstatements but would not do so in the case of material, negligent misstatements. 489
F.2d at 989. The Thomas and Belculfine courts did not reach the question of how to
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may not be the final expression on the issue in their respective circuits. The question of what standards should be applied to inaccurate
warrants also remains open thus far in the other federal circuits.8 0
WHAT RIGHT TO A HEARING

The federal cases dealing with allegations of factual inaccuracies
in search warrants have infrequently confronted the threshold question of determining the circumstances under which the defendant is
entitled to a hearing to inquire into veracity. Most often the question
arises in the context of a pre-trial suppression hearing granted on
deal with recklessness or negligence in the context of a veracity challenge. See 489 F.2d
at 671 n.5; 508 F.2d at 61-62.
80 In United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50 (9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth Circuit recognized that challenges to veracity should be permitted. Id. at 55-56. However, due to the
posture of the Damitz case and two subsequent cases involving veracity challenges, the
Ninth Circuit has never established any definitive standards for suppression.
For instance, in Damitz, the court found that the errors in a government affiant's
affidavit were due to the misrepresentations of a confidential informer upon whom the
government agent had relied in good faith. Id. The court concluded that the purposes
of the exclusionary rule would not be served by excluding evidence where the informer,
not the affiant, was responsible for the error. Id. In United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1
(9th Cir. 1974), the issue before the court was whether the trial court had erred in denying the defendant a hearing on the issue of veracity. Id. at 5. The Harris court held that
the defendants had failed to "make the required initial showing" of some "substantial
. . . falsehood or other imposition upon the magistrate" such as would entitle them to a
hearing. Id. at 6.
Such an initial showing was also required in United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976), where the court upheld a trial court's
denial of an evidentiary hearing to inquire into affidavit veracity, because the "apparent
inconsistencies in the language of the affidavit [did not approach] the 'substantial showing of falsehood' that is required." 522 F.2d at 1073 (quoting from United States v.
Harris, supra at 5-6).
Similarly, the Second Circuit has avoided promulgating any definitive guidelines.
In United States v. Gonzalez, 488 F.2d 833, 838 (2d Cir. 1973), the alleged misstatements were found to be immaterial and "at most . . . negligent." A subsequent panel
read Gonzalez as requiring suppression where misstatements are found to be either
material or "knowing (and therefore intentional)." United States v. Pond, 523 F.2d 210,
213 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976). See also United States v. Bravo,
403 F. Supp. 297, 304-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (upholding a search warrant where the misstatements were found to be immaterial and "neither knowingly nor recklessly made").
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1975), said
that "misrepresentations of fact, may lead to invalidating" a warrant, but because the
errors in the warrant at hand were found to immaterial and there was no allegation that
they were intentional, the warrant was upheld, id. at 41-42. For district court decisions
within the Third Circuit, see United States v. Acon, 403 F. Supp. 1189, 1193-94 (W.D.
Pa. 1975) (upholding warrant challenged on ground of material omissions); United
States v. Baynes, 400 F. Supp. 285, 296-97 & n.20 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (advocating adoption
of the Carmichael standards). See also United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322, 324-25
(10th Cir. 1972), where the court invalidated a warrant containing material misstatements.
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other grounds 8 1 or at trial, when the affiant's testimony differs from
82
his sworn affidavit statements.
Generally, courts have concluded that there is no absolute right
to a hearing to inquire into veracity and have required the defendant
to specifically indicate what he intends to show in the way of falsity.
Two earlier cases from the Second Circuit have been influential in
defining this requirement. In United States v. Halsey, 83 the district
court at a suppression hearing refused to allow the defense to "explor[e] generally" the veracity of a government agent-affiant. 84 The
court said that while an inquiry into veracity should be permitted,
there is no necessity for "a de novo trial of the issuing magistrate's determination as a routine step in every case." 85 The court
placed the burden on the defendant to make "some initial showing of some potential infirmities he proposes to demonstrate."8 6 The
Halsey decision was reaffirmed by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Dunnings,87 where Judge Friendly stated the requirement
for a hearing as "an initial showing of falsehood or other imposition
on the magistrate."88
81 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 488 F.2d 833, 836-37 (2d Cir. 1973); United

States
States
States
Supp.

v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657, 662 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 852 (1973); United
v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 725-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841 (1973); United
v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322, 323-24 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bravo, 403 F.
297, 304-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
82 See, e.g., United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 40-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Garofalo, 496 F.2d 510, 511 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 860 (1974); United States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897, 898 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 827 (1974). See also United States v. Edge, 444 F.2d 1372, 1376 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 855 (1971) (discrepancies between affidavit and complaint).
83 257 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
84 Id. at 1004. The defense counsel's sole assertion was that the government agent's
allegations in the warrant " 'may or may not be true.' " Id.
85 Id. at 1005. In declining to allow veracity challenges routinely, the court noted
the absence of clear precedent on the point and instead relied on a number of stated
"general principles." Id. The court indicated that it is necessary to balance
the possibility that a warrant has issued in reliance on perjury against the potential burden posed
by allowing such "routine trials of search warrants." Id. Also referred to was the role of
the magistrate "as the primary bulwark for the citizen's privacy" and the need to accord
appropriate respect to the warrant-issuing official's determinations. Id. at 1006. The
court concluded by saying that "[tlhe question, after all, is not as to guilt or innocence,
and it does not diminish the value of privacy to acknowledge this." Id.
86 Id. at 1005.
87 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970).
88 425 F.2d at 840. Judge Friendly reasoned that the fourth amendment does not
require that a hearing automatically be held to test veracity, because the primary responsibility for protecting privacy interests is on the magistrates who issue the warrants.
Id. Furthermore, it was stated:
The exclusionary rule, as applied in Fourth Amendment cases, is a blunt in-
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The only case to enumerate more specifically what is required to
obtain a hearing is United States v. Carmichael. Carmichael required
that the defendant allege some "misrepresentation by [a] government
agent of a material fact, or . . . an intentional misrepresentation by
the government agent, whether or not material." 89 Imposing such a
requirement comports with the practice in federal courts for granting
evidentiary hearings on a suppression motion. The defendent's motion to suppress must "alleg[e] facts that, if proved, would require
the grant of relief." 90
THE STATE CASES

In contrast to the almost complete unanimity of the federal
courts in allowing the defendant to challenge affidavit veracity, there
is no consensus on this issue in the state courts. Even so, it is frequently although inaccurately stated that a majority of the states do
not permit challenges to affidavit veracity for purposes of suppression. 9 1 In fact, it appears that only about half of the states have
strument, conferring an altogether disproportionate reward not so much in the
interest of the defendant as in that of society at large. If a choice must be made
between a rule requiring a hearing on the truth of the affidavit in every case
even though no ground for suspicion has been suggested and another which
takes care of the overwhelming bulk of the cases, the policies of the Fourth
Amendment will be adequately served by the latter even though a rare false
affidavit may occasionally slip by.
id.

89 489 F.2d at 988. The Carmichael court also required that allegations of inaccu-

racy be made by sworn affidavit. Id. at 989.
In United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4, 8-9 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
965 (1976), the Sixth Circuit adopted standards for suppression akin to those of
Carmichael but stated the requirement for a hearing somewhat differently. The Luna
court said that, in order to be permitted to impeach a facially sufficient warrant, the
defendant must offer affidavits to show that a challenged statement is false and that the
affiant either knew that the statement was not true or "did not have reasonable grounds
for believing it." 525 F.2d at 8.
90 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 675, at 125-26 (1969) (footnote omitted). It has been suggested that a defendant subjected to a warrant search
should be automatically entitled to an opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. Grano,
supra note 5, at 427. Accord, Herman, supra note 5, at 759 (saying that imposing any
such preliminary requirement "will, in the vast majority of cases, have the same effect as
a substantive rule barring all sub-facial attacks").
91 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Wrenn, 417 U.S. 973, 975 (1974) (White, J., & Burger,
C.J., dissenting), denying cert. to 486 F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1973); King v. United States,
282 F.2d 398, 400 n.4 (4th Cir. 1960); State v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 314, 256 So.2d 98,
101 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 911 (1972); Everhart v. State, 20 Md. App. 71, 82, 315
A.2d 80, 88 (1974); State v. Baca, 84 N.M. 513, 514, 505 P.2d 856, 857 (1973); Kipperman, supra note 5, at 828; Mascolo, supra note 5, at 18; 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 740,
740-41 (1966); 8 IND. L. REV. 738, 741 n.15 (1975).
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actually addressed the issue, and presently the weight of state authority seems to be slightly in favor of permitting such challenges. Only
a small number of jurisdictions have unequivocally held that evidence
92
obtained pursuant to an erroneous warrant must be suppressed.
However, in an additional group of jurisdictions, the courts have upheld warrants against veracity challenges on the grounds that any alleged or demonstrated inaccuracies were either unintentional, immaterial, or both. 93 The fair implication is that these courts would
invalidate inaccurate warrants under at least some circumstances. Additionally, a handful of states have statutes that have been interpreted
as either expressly or impliedly allowing veracity challenges. 9 4 States
which do not allow veracity challenges appear to be somewhat
fewer.

95

92 The leading state cases which have held that evidence obtained pursuant to an
inaccurate warrant must be suppressed in at least some circumstances are McConnell v.
State, 48 Ala. App. 523, 527-28, 266 So. 2d 328, 332-33 (Crim. App. 1972); Davenport v.
State, 515 P.2d 377, 380 (Alas. 1973); State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 1974);
State v. Melson, 284 So. 2d 873, 874-75 (La. 1973); Commonwealth v. Hall, 451 Pa. 201,
204, 302 A.2d 342, 344 (1973); State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 556, 216 S.E.2d 501,
509 (1975); State v. Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 530 P.2d 306, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855
(1975).
93 See State v. Sabari, 109 Ariz. 553, 555-56, 514 P.2d 474, 476-77 (1973); Williams v. State, 232 Ga. 213, 213-14, 205 S.E.2d 859, 860 (1974); State v. Baca, 84
N.M. 513, 515, 505 P.2d 856, 858 (1973); State v. Vance, 25 N.C. App. 92, 94, 212
S.E.2d 249, 250, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 264, 214 S.E.2d 436 (1975); State v. Dodson,
43 Ohio App. 2d 31, 36, 332 N.E.2d 371, 375 (1974); Scott v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 504,
243 N.W.2d 215 (1976). See also State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 864-65 n.3 (Me.
1974).
94 See Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 90, 501 P.2d 234, 243, 104 Cal. Rptr.
226, 235 (1972) (en banc), noted in 6 LOYOLA U.L.A.L. REV. 437 (1973); People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 186, 211 N.E.2d 644, 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243, 246 (1965), noted in
51 CORNELL L.Q. 822 (1966) and 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 740 (1966); State v. Wright, 511
P.2d 1223, 1225-26 n.3 (Ore. 1973) (en bane); State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 138,
514 P.2d 800, 802 (1973).
95 See Liberto v. State, 248 Ark. 350, 356-57, 451 S.W.2d 464, 468 (1970) (alternative
holding); State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, 219, 309 A.2d 135, 147 (Super. Ct.
1973); People v. Bak, 45 II1. 2d 140, 146, 258 N.E.2d 341, 344, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
882 (1970); Caslin v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Ky. 1973); Tucker v. State,
244 Md. 488, 499-500, 224 A.2d 111, 117-18 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967);
State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 178-79, 293 A.2d 649, 655 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945
(1973); Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 553, 399 S.W.2d 507, 511 (1965). See also State
v. English, 71 Mont. 343, 347-48, 229 P. 727, 729 (1924) (dictum).
Additonally, there are a number of state cases that can be interpreted as prohibiting
inquiry into the underlying truth of statements in a search warrant affidavit, but it is not
clear whether they specifically involved challenges to the truth of an affiant's statements. It appears that in these cases the defense was objecting to the conclusory nature
of the affiant's statements, rather than attempting to challenge their underlying truth.
See, e.g., Seager v. State, 200 Ind. 579, 581-82, 164 N.E. 274, 275 (1928); State v. Bru-
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Most of the state cases do not indulge in a great deal of analysis
of the theoretical or policy arguments that bear on whether a challenge should or should not be permitted. Some of the cases which
allow inquiry into veracity either have relied heavily on the federal
circuit cases discussed above in formulating standards for dealing with
false or inaccurate warrants 96 or have expressly adopted one of the
97
prevailing circuit standards.
The leading state case rejecting the idea that a showing of inaccuracy can be the basis of a motion to suppress evidence is State v.
Petillo,9 s decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1972.
Petillo was convicted of violating state gambling laws primarily on the
basis of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant search of his home. 9 9
The affidavit sworn out by a state law enforcement officer, on the
basis of which the warrant was issued, contained allegations that the
gioni, 320 Mo. 202, 206-07, 7 S.W.2d 262, 263 (1928); Baker v. State, 448 P.2d 282, 283
(Okla. Crim. App. 1968); State v. Seymour, 46 R.I. 257, 258-60, 126 A. 755, 756 (1924).
9 In State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974), the Iowa supreme court announced standards for hearings on inaccuracy as well as for suppression of warrants
found to be inaccurate. The court analyzed the "various, and sometimes conflicting"
cases on the issue, concluding that in order to be granted a hearing the defense must
make "a preliminary showing under oath" that a government official deliberately made
a false statement or that he made an unintentional but nevertheless material error. Id. at
616. Should either of these two factors be shown at such a hearing, the warrant would
be invalidated. Id. These criteria for invalidating warrants correspond to those announced in United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973) (discussed in notes
42-52 supra and accompanying text). The Thomas criteria were also utilized in Williams
v. State, 232 Ga. 213, 214, 205 S.E.2d 859, 860 (1974), where a warrant was upheld on a
finding that the errors it contained were neither material nor intentional.
In State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 216 S.E.2d 501 (1975), the court, commenting that it
was "[m]indful of the divergent views of the federal circuits," concluded that a warrant
should be invalidated only where it was shown that an officer "intentionally, recklessly,
or in bad faith recite[d] facts he knew or should have known to be erroneous." Id. at
556, 216 S.E.2d at 509. According to the court, this formulation satisfied the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary remedy while preserving the state's interest in the admissibility of probative evidence. Id. at 556-57, 216 S.E.2d at 509.
97The Carmichael standards were expressly adopted by a Washington court in State
v. Goodlow, 11 Wash. App. 533, 535, 523 P.2d 1204, 1206 (1974). The Goodlotw court
also referred to dicta in two previous Washington appellate court decisions in which the
principle of allowing veracity challenges was approved. Id. at 534, 523 P.2d at 1205. See
State v. Lehman, 8 Wash. App. 408, 414-15, 506 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1973); State v. Hink, 6
Wash. App. 374, 377-78, 492 P.2d 1053, 1056 (1972).
98 61 N.J. 165, 293 A.2d 649 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
Petillo was subsequently granted a writ of habeas corpus by the New Jersey federal
district court in United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 400 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.J.
1975). For discussion of the district court's decision see notes 112-27 infra and accompanying text. That opinion contains a fuller explication of the record at the state trial
court level. See 400 F. Supp. at 1158-70.
99 61 N.J. at 168, 293 A.2d at 650.
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officer had dialed a number supplied to him by an informant and
listed as Petillo's phone number, and that the officer had placed a
gambling bet. 10 0 At the hearing on his motion to suppress the evidence seized, Petillo produced a telephone company representative
who testified from company records that the phone number which
the affiant swore he called to place the bet was not at that time assigned to Petillo.' 01 Nevertheless the trial court denied the defense
motion to suppress, finding that the defense had not shown that the
officer had perjured himself in swearing out the warrant and, further,
that the allegations concerning the phone call were not necessary to
2
establish probable cause in the warrant. 0
On appeal, the New Jersey supreme court upheld the trial
court's denial of the motion to suppress and directed itself to the
issue of whether the trial court should have allowed the defense to
introduce evidence to controvert the factual averments in the officer's
affidavit. 10 3 The court concluded that veracity challenges should not
be permitted, casting its decision in terms of the policy issues standing at the heart of the controversy: "[A] balance must be struck, and
• . . the social costs of unwarranted extension of search and seizure
principles should not be ignored." 10 4
The Petillo decision constitutes a compendium of the arguments
made in the cases which have refused to allow such an extension of
the exclusionary remedy. Analysis of the decision reveals the presence of four main arguments in support of the results reached. The
100 Id. at 169-70, 293 A.2d at 651. Although the issue was not treated in the New
Jersey supreme court opinion, Petillo requested at the trial court level that the informant be produced in order to shed light on the question of whether the officer was
lying, but this request was denied. United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 400 F.
Supp. 1152, 1163-64 (D.N.J. 1975).
101 61 N.J. at 171-72, 293 A.2d at 652. The prosecutor objected to the introduction of
evidence to show that the affiant peijured himself, on the grounds that the only issue
"properly before the court" was the legal sufficiency of the officer's affidavit.
The objection was overruled. Id.
The telephone company representative testified that the phone number allegedly
dialed by the officer had at one time been assigned to Petillo. However, the telephone
company records indicated that some three months prior to the date the officer swore he
placed a bet over that line, Petillo's phone number had been changed. The old number
had not been reassigned to another customer, and the telephone company representative concluded that if the officer had dialed the old number, he would have been connected to an intercept operator who would have informed him that the number had
been changed. The representative also testified, however, that it was within the realm
of possibility that the intercept mechanism could have been circumvented. Id.
102 Id.
at 173, 293 A.2d at 653.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 178, 293 A.2d at 656.
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court's primary argument was that the requirements of the fourth
amendment are fulfilled if an impartial judicial authority, having examined the sworn statements of fact in the affidavit, concludes that
there is sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of a search
warrant. 10 5 It is the responsibility of the warrant-issuing authority,
the court emphasized, to examine the sworn statements, judge the
affiant's credibility, and, if not satisfied, to question the affiant further
or require additional evidence to support the request for a warrant. 106
Another of the court's arguments went to the nature of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for fourth amendment violations. The
Petillo court noted that an officer who is untruthful in swearing out a
warrant risks "the sanctions of indictment for perjury or false swear-,
ing, a charge of criminal contempt, and assessment of monetary damages in a civil action.' 10 7 The court concluded that the existence of
such remedies is sufficient to safeguard fourth amendment rights,
rendering needless the application of the exclusionary sanction in
such cases. 0 8
The remaining arguments are closely related. The court pointed
out that the standard of proof applicable in an ex parte warrantissuing proceeding does not require a conclusive showing of criminal
guilt, but rather only a finding by the judge that there is probable
cause to believe that a crime is taking place at the location to be
searched.109 Likewise, a suppression hearing inquiry into the truth of
105 Id. at 173-74, 293 A.2d at 653. The Petillo court quoted from its previous decision in State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 388, 201 A.2d 39, 45 (1964), for the proposition that
"[t]he Fourth Amendment is served if a judicial mind passes upon the existence of
probable cause," id., and noted that this very language in Burnett was cited with approval in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 306-08 (1967). See 61 N.J. at 173, 293 A.2d at
653. In accord with Petillo are State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, 218, 309 A.2d
135, 145 (Super. Ct. 1973), and People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144-46, 258 N.E.2d 341,
343-44, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970) (also noting the Burnett and McCray opinions).
116 61 N.J. at 173, 293 A.2d at 653.
107 Id.
at 174, 293 A.2d at 654.
108 See id. at 174, 293 A.2d at 653-54.
109 61 N.J. at 177, 293 A.2d at 655. The thrust of this, as well as of the court's main

argument is that the existence of probable cause must be determined from the vantage
point of the warrant-issuing authority. The Petillo court said that the court in a warrantissuing proceeding
is concerned only with whether the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are
sufficient to lead a reasonably discreet and prudent judge to the belief that the
offense charged has been or is being committed. If so probable cause exists for
issuance of a warrant.
61 N.J. at 177, 293 A.2d at 655 (emphasis added). In so concluding the Petillo court
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the factual assertions in an affidavit would require a time-consuming
proceeding which would become "tantamount to a trial of the merits
of the criminal charge, without actually resulting in a determination
of the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence." 110 Allowing such proceedings, the court asserted, "would add a further heavy burden" to
the trial court calendar."'
The issues addressed in State v. Petillo were drawn on quite
different lines by a federal district court in United States ex rel.
Petillo v. New Jersey, 1 2 a habeas corpus proceeding brought by
relied upon Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925). Dumbra, however, has also
been relied upon in arguments in favor of allowing veracity challenges. See, e.g., Kipperman, supra note 5, at 827-28. Dumbra involved a challenge to the sufficiency of an
affidavit issued pursuant to the provisions of a federal statute. 268 U.S. at 431-32, 436-37.
In determining whether the warrant was issued upon a showing of probable cause, the
Court said that there was probable cause where " 'the facts and circumstances . . . are
such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been
committed.' " Id. at 439 (quoting from Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 504-05
(1925)). The Dumbra Court also made use of some language which indicates that at the
very least an affiant must have some belief in the truth of the facts asserted to support
the issuance of a warrant:
In determining what is probable cause, we are not called upon to determine whether the offense charged has in fact been committed. We are concerned only with the question whether the affiant had reasonable grounds at
the time of his affidavit and the issuance of the warrant for the belief that the
law was being violated on the premises to be searched ....
268 U.S. at 441. For further discussion of this language see Herman, supra note 5, at 741
n.90.
11061 N.J. at 177, 293 A.2d at 655. See Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976), where
the majority commented on the impact that the application of the exclusionary rule has
on criminal trials:
[T]he focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, is diverted
from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding.
Id. at 3049-50 (footnote omitted). For examples of the extent to which a challenge to
veracity can divert attention from the question of guilt or innocence, especially where
the claim is that the affiant's statements were perjurious, see United States v. Belculfine, 395 F. Supp. 7, 7-9 (D. Mass. 1975), remand of 508 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1974) (hearing
held to determine the truthfulness of postal inspectors); United States ex rel. Petillo v.
New Jersey, 400 F. Supp. 1152, 1158-70 (D.N.J. 1975) (setting forth details of state trial
court inquiries into veracity of a state trooper and a police undercover agent).
111 61 N.J. at 177-78, 293 A.2d at 665. Accord, State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp.
211, 218, 309 A.2d 135, 145 (1973) (quoting from 61 N.J. at 177, 293 A.2d at 655). The
prospect of dealing with an onerous increase in search and seizure litigation has even
influenced decisions in those federal courts which allow veracity challenges: It has
been held that a defendant must make a preliminary showing of inaccuracy before
being granted a hearing. See notes 81-90 supra and accompanying text.
112 400 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.J.
1975), vacated and remanded, 541 F.2d 275 (3d
Cir.), original decision reinstated and writs of habeas corpus granted, 418 F. Supp. 686
(D.N.J. 1976). For a discussion of the district court's opinion on remand, see note 118
infra.
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Petillo to obtain his release from state custody. Petillo's petition was
consolidated with that of Angelo Albanese, whose trial court motion
to suppress, like Petillo's, was based upon a claim of falsity in a
search warrant affidavit and was likewise denied. 113 Both habeas petitions were granted, the district court holding that the fourth amendment requires the exclusion of evidence obtained by a search warrant
1 14
containing "a materially inaccurate affidavit, knowingly submitted."
Countering the New Jersey supreme court's holding that the
fourth amendment requirement of probable cause was satisfied by a
magistrate's ex parte conclusions, the federal district court concluded
that a warrant issued in reliance on intentionally false statements "is
no more valid than any other court process, writ or order which is
issued in reliance on false swearing." 11 5 Consequently, a search made
pursuant to a warrant obtained by false statements "is a search without any warrant at all." 11 6 As a corollary to this holding, the court
found the state court proceedings defective on two due process
grounds. The district court held that a defendant must be granted "a
fair opportunity to vindicate this federally-guaranteed right, at least
once he has made a prima facie showing of its violation." 1 17 Because
113 400 F. Supp. at 1154-56. The Albanese case also involved a police officer-affiant.
The officer's testimony at Albanese's first trial on gambling charges differed from statements contained in his search warrant affidavit. After a mistrial was declared because of
a hung jury, and prior to his second trial, Albanese filed a motion to suppress based
upon the alleged affidavit misstatements. In his affidavit, the officer asserted that on a
number of occasions he had followed Albanese to a series of locations where he observed him engaged in what were purported to be gambling transactions. At the trial,
however, the officer admitted that he had not had Albanese under surveillance on all of
the dates alleged in his affidavit. He further testified that even on those dates when he
had followed Albanese, he had not followed him to every location on his route. Id. at
1171-72.
4
1 Id. at 1157, 1189-90.
115 Id. at 1185. No authority was cited for the proposition that a perjurious warrant is
ipso facto invalid. However, a similar argument has been made. Kipperman suggested
that the use of a perjured warrant is analogous "to the knowing use of perjured testimony at trial," Kipperman, supra note 5, at 831 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959)). This suggestion overlooks the fact, however, that the objection to the use of
perjured testimony at trial is that it bears on the quality of proofs put before the jury.
See Napue v. Illinois, supra, at 269-70, 272. The credibility of evidence is not at issue
in a suppression motion based upon a claim of an invalid search. See Stone v. Powell,
96 S. Ct. 3037, 3054 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 412-13 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
116

400 F. Supp. at 1185.

"I Id. at 1157. At a later point in its decision, the district court expanded on what it

would consider a "prima facie showing," saying that a defendant is entitled to a veracity hearing when he "introduces substantial evidence from an authoritative and independent source which directly contradicts some of the material allegations [in an] af-

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 827

both Petillo and Albanese had been foreclosed to some degree from
inquiry into alleged falsities in affidavits, the court concluded that
each had been deprived of "a full, fair and adequate hearing" in the
state courts. 118 Specifically, the district court held that the state in
the Petillo case should have been required to produce the informant
that the officer allegedly relied upon "in order for any fair determination to be made on the question whether the [officer] lied in his
affidavit."119
THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES

The New Jersey district court's opinion in ex rel. Petillo is one of
the few instances in which a court has unequivocally held that the
fidavit." Id. at 1166. However, in contrast to the practice which has evolved in most
federal courts, see, e.g., United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 1974);
United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844
(1975), the district court in Petillo suggested that merely excising those portions of the
challenged affidavit which have been shown to be false would not satisfy due process requirements. The court indicated that a showing of falsity in a portion of an affidavit
brings into serious question the credibility of the whole and requires the suppressionhearing court to reevaluate the entire affidavit. 400 F. Supp. at 1166.
118 400 F. Supp. at 1183. The state appealed the district court's decision to the
Third Circuit, but subsequent to oral argument the circuit court vacated the judgment of
the district court and remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of Stone v.
Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976). United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 541 F.2d 275
(3d Cir. 1976). In Stone, the Supreme Court held that fourth amendment claims of state
defendants would be cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings only where the
defendant had been denied "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim." Stone v. Powell, supra note 3052 (footnote omitted).
In its opinion on remand the district court noted that it had considered its original
grant of the habeas corpus petitions with an awareness of the issues pending in Stone v.
Powell and said that having examined the Stone opinion and heard arguments thereupon, it was "convinced that both petitions fall squarely within the remaining ambit of
application of the exclusionary rule on collateral review." United States ex rel. Petillo v.
New Jersey, 418 F. Supp. 686, 689 (D.N.J. 1976).
119 400 F. Supp. at 1166. In order to resolve the question of the officer's credibility,
the court concluded that the state should be required to produce the informant who was
allegedly present when the officer made the phone call to Petillo's residence and that
such a requirement would not run afoul of the informer's privilege recognized by the
Supreme Court in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 400 F. Supp. at 1166-67 &
n.8. In McCray, the Court held that the due process clause does not require the government to disclose the identity of a confidential informant at a suppression hearing.
386 U.S. at 312-13. As the district court in ex rel. Petillo pointed out, however, the
McCray Court had specifically noted, id. at 313, the absence of any indication of untrustworthiness in the testimony of the officers who relied on the confidential informant.
400 F. Supp. at 1167 n.8. Thus the district court concluded that, under McCray, the
government can be required to produce a confidential informant at a suppression hearing once the credibility of the affiant has been brought into question by a "prima facie
showing of material misrepresentation." Id. at 1167 n.8. See Quinn, McCray v. Illinois:
Probable Cause and the Informer Privilege, 45 DENVER L.J. 399, 421 (1968).
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issue of truthfulness in search warrant affidavits is one of constitutional dimension. Most of the federal and state cases avoid the constitutional issues or treat them perfunctorily,12 0 perhaps because such
analysis is highly problematic and because 2no totally satisfactory constitutional theory has yet been formulated.' '
The theory advanced by the district court in ex rel. Petillo is
essentially that a warrant based upon deliberately false statements is
invalid ab initio and thus the search resulting from such a warrant is
illegal and violative of the fourth amendment. 122 The search being
illegal, the state defendant is entitled to exclusion of evidence seized
thereby.123 The court emphasized that it is the bad faith of the affiant
120 Some of the federal court cases discussed above have indicated that their decisions are not necessarily constitutionally based. See, e.g., United States v. Damitz, 495
F.2d 50, 54 (9th Cir. 1974) (by implication); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983,
988 n.13 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Jutz, 389 F. Supp. 506, 509 (E.D.
Wis. 1975) (by implication).
A few state court decisions have held that veracity challenges are constitutionally
based in certain situations. State v. Melson, 284 So. 2d 873, 874-75 (La. 1973); Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 336-37, 263 A.2d 441, 444 (1970). See also State v.
Moses, 24 Ariz. App. 305, 308, 537 P.2d 1363, 1366 (1975). The constitutional aspects of
veracity challenges have not been neglected in commentary, however. See, e.g.,
Forkosh, supra note 5; Grano, supra note 5, at 422-24; He-nan, supra note 5; Note,
supra note 5; Comment, supra note 5, 63 J. CmiM. L.C. & P.S. at 41-45; Comment,
supra note 5, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. at 107-11.
121 The dearth of analysis in cases favoring veracity challenges has been noted in
Herman, supra note 5, at 728-29. Professor Herman commented that these cases "are
about as poorly reasoned as cases prohibiting" such challenges. Id. at 728.
122

400 F. Supp. at 1185.

Id. The district court's concern seems primarily to be the protection of the "integrity of the judicial process" and only secondarily of the privacy right of the individual
under the fourth amendment. Judge Stern commented that
there is a special need to permit the factual testing of an affidavit upon which a
warrant is based, if we are to protect the judicial system itself from improper
use by the unscrupulous. When a warrant is issued and then used to search, it
is the court's own writ which sanctions the officer's intrusion upon the home or
person of a citizen. It is of paramount importance to the integrity of the judicial
process that such writs not be procured by perjury, deception or other improprieties.
Id. at 1179. The court further stated that "the basis of the exclusionary rule has properly
been described as 'the imperative of judicial integrity.' " Id. (quoting from Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
In Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), the Supreme Court definitively stated that
the primary rationale behind the exclusionary rule is not the " 'imperative of judicial
integrity,' " and it further commented on "the limited role of this justification in the
determination whether to apply the rule in a particular context." Id. at 3047 (footnote
omitted). The Court also noted that past decisions demonstrated results inconsistent
with that rationale. Id. (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (standing
necessary to assert fourth amendment violation in suppression hearing); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (illegal seizure of defendant does not invalidate judicial pro123
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that offends the Constitution, not merely the fact that the affidavit is
inaccurate. 1 24 It is too simplistic an analysis, however, merely to assert that the validity of a court's process depends upon the good faith
of the person whose statements support the issuance of the order.
For while it is unquestionable that perjury in a warrant offends the
integrity of the judicial process and cannot be condoned, it is not at
all clear that a search pursuant to such a warrant in and of itself is a
violation of the fourth amendment. 12 5 It is the court's secondary
analysis, emphasizing the nature of the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy designed to deter police misconduct, 126 that
presents a more compelling argument for exclusion in cases of deliberate misrepresentation. Perjurious statements made by police officers to obtain search warrants, as Judge Stern aptly noted, are
12 7
"squarely within the zone at which the exclusionary rule is aimed."'
A constitutional theory with somewhat broader scope has been
advanced in cases which rely on or refer to the Supreme Court's holdings in Aguilar v. Texas 128 and Spinelli v. United States.129 In
Aguilar, the Court examined a warrant sworn out by police officers
who relied on information supplied by an unnamed informant. 130 The
Court held that the warrant was invalid because the officer-affiant's
allegations that the informant was credible and reliable were concluceeding); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (illegally seized evidence admissible in grand jury proceeding)). For an extended discussion of the Court's shift from
an initial "imperative of judicial integrity" rationale to the deterrence theory see Gibbons, Practical Prophylaxis and Appellate Methodology: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Case Study in the Decisional Process, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 295 (1972).
124 400 F. Supp. at 1179. Thus, Judge Stern's theory reaches only deliberate, perjurious statements and does not speak to the question of how negligent or reckless inaccuracies should be treated. Id. at 1179 n.12.
125 Professor Herman has commented that
the exclusionary rule does not come into play until a fourth amendment violation has been established, and characterizing a police practice as unsavory or
dishonest does not automatically make it unconstitutional.
Herman, supra note 5, at 729.
126 See 400 F. Supp. at 1185-88 n.17.
127 Id. at 1185-86 n.17. The Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037
(1976), emphasized the importance of the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule
when it sharply restricted state defendants' rights to federal habeas corpus relief on the
basis of fourth amendment claims. The Court invoked a balancing process to "[weigh]
the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to collateral review
of Fourth Amendment claims," id. at 3049, concluding that any deterrent effect in such
cases is not sufficient to justify "the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice," id. at 3052.
128 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
129 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
130 378 U.S. at 109.
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sory, and because the affidavit set forth none of the underlying circumstances on which the informant based his allegations. 13 1 Spinelli
reiterated this "two-pronged test" for evaluating warrants containing
statements by confidential informants and endorsed Aguilar's "underlying principle" that the existence of probable cause must be determined by an objective magistrate, based on the facts before him, and
not on the biased, conclusory opinions of the officers seeking the
warrant. 132
In State v. Melson, 13 3 the Louisiana supreme court relied on the
language of Aguilar and Spinelli and concluded that allowing a factually defective warrant to stand unchallenged would permit the affiant,
in effect, to usurp the magistrate's function by supplying him with
inaccurate information.13 4 The Melson court demanded that the
magistrate draw his inferences and base his determinations on assertions which are in fact true, and would not consider the good faith of
an inaccurate affiant.13 5 This "objective truth" requirement, however,
131 Id. at 114. The Court emphasized that the warrant must set forth facts upon
which the magistrate may base his finding of probable cause. Id. at 114-15.
132

393 U.S. at 415.

284 So. 2d 873 (La. 1973). The court, with three justices dissenting, impliedly
overruled its previous decision in State v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 256 So. 2d 98 (1971).
Anselrno had indicated that veracity challenges were not constitutionally required. Id. at
316-21, 256 So. 2d at 102-04.
134 284 So. 2d at 874. In Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 263 A.2d 441
(1970), the Pennsylvania court also extrapolated a constitutional principle supporting
veracity challenges from the Aguilar and Spinelli decisions. The court noted (citing
Aguilar and Spinelli) that it has been "well established" that the magistrate must have
before him information such as would
persuade a reasonable man that probable cause for the search exists. . . . The
purpose of requiring this information is to give the magistrate the opportunity
of knowing and weighing the facts and determining objectively for himself the
need for invading privacy in order to enforce the law.
Id. at 336-37, 263 A.2d at 444 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Comment, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV., supra note 5, at 107-08, which argued that "[t]he policies
behind the fourth amendment doctrine expressed in Aguilar and its progeny appear to
constitutionally dictate overturning searches based on material affidavit falsehoods."
(Footnote omitted.) Accord, Forkosh, supra note 5, at 305 & n.33.
135 284 So. 2d at 874-75. The court said that because probable cause was required
by both the state and federal constitutions for issuance of a search warrant,
if probable cause does not exist, there would be a constitutional infirmity in the
search warrant. It matters not whether the infirmity arise because of the faulty
legal conclusions of the issuing magistrate, or the false allegations of the affiant.
Id. at 875. Accord, United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975). The "objective truth" approach of Melson and Thomas was
rejected by the California supreme court in Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77,
96-97, 501 P.2d 234, 248-49, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 240-41 (1972) (en banc). The court said
that "this approach [is] inconsistent with the overriding principle of reasonableness
which governs the application of the Fourth Amendment to the criminal law." Id. at 97,
133
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is inconsistently applied. The Louisiana court would allow inquiry
into the statements made by a police affiant, but would not allow
inquiry into those of a confidential informant.1 36 It would seem that if
the fourth amendment requires the absolute truth of the facts relied
on in determining probable cause, then the statements of police officers and their confidential informants should be equally open to
37
challenge.1
Another line of analysis has been offered by Professor Lawrence
Herman, who has characterized the arguments against allowing veracity challenges as less than "flimsy.' 1 3 8 Professor Herman's analysis
began with an examination of the fourth amendment's two requirements for a search, i.e., "probable cause and particularity.' ' 13 9 He
reasoned that the purpose of those dual requirements was to fulfill
the expectations of citizens of a free society "that official intrusions
into any aspect of their innocent or apparently innocent lives will be

501 P.2d at 248, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 240. The court reasoned that where "an affiant has
reasonably relied" on the truth of the facts he asserts, exclusion does not effectuate any
deterrent purpose because "the affiant has already made a reasonable attempt to comply
with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 97, 501 P.2d at 249, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 241.
136See 284 So. 2d at 875. The court concluded that policy reasons argue in favor of
treating affiants differently from their informers and that a "balancing [of] interests"
supports the protection of confidential informers. Id.
137Cf. Comment, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV., supra note 5, at 124-25.
138 Herman, supra note 5, at 723. Professor Herman identified a number of arguments frequently found in cases prohibiting veracity challenges, successively analyzing
them and demonstrating flaws and inconsistencies. Id. at 723-27. His objections to several of the arguments are well taken. For instance, he argued that review in a warrantissuing proceeding does not sufficiently guard against police error in warrants and that
the prospect of a perjury prosecution does not deter deliberate lying by police. Id. at
723-24. Accord, United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 400 F. Supp. at 1181-83;
Grano, supra note 5, at 407-11, 414-15, both of which make convincing arguments that
often police do not hesitate to perjure themselves to obtain warrants.
At least one of the other commonly advanced arguments is not so easily dismissed.
Professor Herman characterizes as "nonsensical" the argument that a hearing on a veracity challenge "would confuse the ultimate issue of the defendant's guilt with the preliminary issue of whether someone misrepresented information in an affidavit." Herman, supra note 5, at 725. He correctly pointed out that the suppression hearing takes
place before trial, out of the presence of the jury, and therefore could not operate to
confuse the issues before the fact-finder. But Professor Herman's comment misses the
point behind the "confusion" argument, which does not go to the question of whether
the jury might become confused by the introduction of the veracity issue. Rather, the
argument is directed at the fact that a veracity challenge might well entail a hearing of
such wide scope that it would be "tantamount to a trial of the merits of the criminal
charge." State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 177, 293 A.2d 649, 655 (1972); see Stone v. Powell,
96 S. Ct. 3037, 3049-51 (1976).
139Herman, supra note 5, at 730-31.

1976]

COMMENT

kept to the barest minimum compatible with public safety."' 40 Thus,
the government is compelled to submit to a process-that of determining the existence of probable cause-that is aimed at "directing
intrusive activity toward apparent guilt and away from apparently innocent privacy."' 14 1 Breaking down the elements of the process into
the acquisition and transmission of information, and the drawing of
inferences therefrom, 14 2 he argued that there must be an examination
of the accuracy of each phase of the process in order to ensure "fidel14 3
ity to fourth amendment principle[s].'
Furthermore, Professor Herman concluded that the part played
by each of these "functionaries of government who participated in the
process"'144 must be subject to a minimum standard of reasonableness, 145 under which negligent misstatements as well as more intentional ones would be objectionable.146 As to the element of materiality, Professor Herman distinguished between the "atomistic view,"

140 Id.

at 732.

141Id. (footnote omitted).

142 Id. at 732. The author indicated that the law enforcement officer's responsibility
in the process of determining probable cause is to acquire information and transmit it to
the magistrate, and that of the magistrate is to draw inferences from that information. Id.
at 739-40.
143Id.

at 740.

144Id. at 743. This would permit challenges not only to the veracity of government
affiants but to their informants who are other law enforcement officers. Id. Professor
Herman also concluded that for purposes of a veracity challenge a non-confidential
"civilian" informant should also in some situations be considered a government
functionary and thus subject to a veracity challenge. Id. at 745-46. On the subject of challenges to the veracity of confidential informants, Professor Herman was less sure in his
analysis. He suggested that the decision in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S, 300 (1967),
might be reconsidered in order to accommodate the view that defendants have a fourth
amendment right to have revealed to them the identity of confidential informants. Herman, supra note 5, at 746 n.11.
145 Herman, supra note 5, at 748-49 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175-76 (1949), wherein the Supreme Court discussed at some length the nature of probable cause). Professor Herman pointed out that the Court in Brinegar repeatedly referred to a reasonableness standard in determining the validity of a search. Herman,
supra, at 748-49. But the Brinegar Court was concerned with a warrantless search,
where the initial determination of probable cause to make a search is that of an officer,
not a magistrate. The Court said:
Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their
duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on
their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts
leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.
Brinegar v. United States, supra at 176. An analogous application of the Brinegar
reasoning to a warrant search would hold the magistrate to a standard of reasonableness,
for it is he who determines probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
146 Herman, supra note 5, at 748-50.
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under which an immaterial culpable misstatement in a warrant would
not necessitate suppression,1 47 and the "regulatory view."' 148 Under
this latter view, once a misstatement is determined to be culpable
under the reasonableness standard-i.e., negligent, reckless, or perjurious-the materiality of any such misstatement would be irrelevant. 14 9 The rationale proffered for this result was that "[a]lthough
the culpable misrepresentation did not negate probable cause in this
case, it nevertheless put innocent privacy to risk."' 5 0 The practical
result for a court adopting a constitutional theory based on the "reglatory view" of the fourth amendment would be the invalidation of
warrants containing misstatements that are either negligent, reckless,
15 1
or perjurious, regardless of their materiality.
COLLATERAL PROBLEMS IN VERACITY CHALLENGES

The recognition of a right to challenge veracity has given rise to
several collateral issues, many of which have not yet been satisfactorily resolved or even addressed in the decided cases. The most obvious difficulty with allowing such challenges is the prospect of permitting suppression hearings to become plenary trials on the question of
the accuracy of the facts alleged in a warrant. Furthermore, where
there is a claim that a warrant contains deliberate misrepresentations,
the police or government agents who swore out the warrant become,
in effect, defendants to a charge of perjury. The task of the court at a
suppression hearing becomes not only that of resolving the accuracy
issue, but also of determining the subjective state of mind of the
"accused" officers. It would seem that such a question more appro52
priately would be resolved in an actual trial on such a charge.1

147 Id.
at 753. Thus, courts focusing on the materiality of a warrant error would be
considered of the "atomistic" view. Such a court is
likely to conclude that the fourth amendment is not violated by an immaterial
representation-even one that is deliberate or made with purpose to deceive
the magistrate. The very immateriality of the misrespresentation means that it
could have played no role in the magistrate's decision to authorize intrusive
action.

Id.
148 The characterization of these two views is adopted by Professor Herman from
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). See
Herman, supra note 5, at 753.
149 See Herman, supra note 5, at 753-54.
50Id. at 753 (emphasis in original).
151See id. at 753-54.
152 Although it seems unlikely that a prosecutor would undertake to prosecute

police officers for committing perjury in swearing out a warrant, the issue might arise as
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Where the court undertakes to determine whether an affiant was
reckless or negligent in making erroneous statements, consideration
of tort law concepts, rather than criminal law principles (as in the
case of a perjury charge), might be appropriate. Should the court take
into consideration the degree to which the procedures followed by
the officer-affiant in gathering information were in conformity with
accepted police practices in the locality? There are of course minimum constitutional standards applicable to police and government
agents in their information-gathering activities, and a breach of that
standard is constitutionally deficient regardless of whether the action
in question is "accepted" police department or government law enforcement agency practice. But, arguably, there are situations in
which the question should be answered with reference to the "standard" practice in the locality or agency. Thus, if the issue is whether
police statements were negligent, the defendant might attempt to
show that the police or government agencies failed to follow their
own regulations or procedures governing information gathering. Conversely, the prosecutor to a certain extent might be able to defend
against a claim of negligent error in a warrant by showing that the
officer-afflant conformed to standard police practice.
Another important collateral issue that arises relative to veracity
challenges, and one rarely mentioned, is the applicable burden of
proof. The standard of proof and the allocation of the burden15 3 could
be largely determinative of the outcome of a suppression motion
based on warrant inaccuracies. Some courts have placed an initial
burden on the defendant to make a "prima facie showing of inaccuracy" in order to grant a further inquiry into the issue.154 Those
courts have not, however, discussed whether the prosecution must
thenrebut that prima facie showing in order to avoid a suppression

to whether the due process rights of the officers are implicated when an allegation of
perjury is made at a suppression hearing. At what point must the officer-affiant be informed that such an accusation has been made, and be advised of his right to exert a
fifth amendment privilege?
153 Generally speaking, the defendant, as the moving party, should have the burden
of going forward with evidence to prove the existence of claimed inaccuracies, and also
to show that the affiant was either negligent, reckless, or deliberately misrepresentative
in swearing out the warrant. 8A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 41.08 [4] (2d ed. 1975).
See Comment, Procedural Problems of a Motion to Suppress Evidence in a Federal
Criminal Case, 1 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REv. 188, 188-89 (1975). But see Berard v.
United States, 525 F.2d 319, 320 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 913 (1976) (discussed in note 155 infra); United States v. Swanson, 399 F. Supp. 441 (D. Nev. 1975)
(discussed in note 156 infra).
154 See notes 81-90 supra and accompanying text.
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motion 155 or whether the defendant must then go forward with evidence to establish the inaccuracies in order to prevail.
Yet another important consideration concerns the degree to
which courts will require that the identities of confidential informants
be revealed or that they themselves be produced at a suppression
hearing to resolve veracity questions. Theoretically, a jurisdiction or
federal circuit which takes a less stringent view of the requirements
for obtaining a hearing, and which places the burden on the prosecution to rebut the defendant's prima facie showing of inaccuracy, could
interfere with the effective use of confidential informants by law enforcement officials. The unwillingness of such authorities to compromise a confidential source could result in a defendant prevailing
on a suppression motion on only a preliminary showing of inaccuracy. 156 On the other hand, the informer's privilege could be
easily abused in order to avoid an effective veracity challenge if the
prosecution is always allowed to limit a veracity challenge to the
statements of law enforcement officials. Where the police know or
suspect that their information is false, they might be influenced to
claim routinely in obtaining a warrant that the information was obtained by confidential sources which are in fact non-existent.
55

1 See Berard v. United States, 525 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
913 (1976), where the Eighth Circuit upheld a district court's rejection of a suppression motion based on alleged inaccuracies. 525 F.2d at 320. In the Appendix to its
opinion, the circuit court reprinted the district court's opinion on the denial of the motion, in which the district court asserted that
"[w]hen the validity of a search warrant is challenged, the burden is on the
government to establish its validity by a preponderance of the evidence. United
States v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 177 .... "
525 F.2d at 320. Matlock, however, does not appear to be on point, as it involved a
warrantless search in which consent to the search was the fact disputed by the defense.
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166-68 (1974). In warrantless searches, the
prosecution has the burden of proving that the search was valid because there is a
presumption of illegality. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). There is no
such presumption, however, with regard to warrant searches.
156 In United States v. Swanson, 399 F. Supp. 441 (D. Nev. 1975), a district court
granted a suppression motion where the Government refused to disclose the names of
two informants who had supposedly supplied information contained in an affidavit used
to obtain a wiretap authorization. Id. at 445-46. It had developed that some of the information contained in the affidavit and pertaining to the alleged informants had been
"materially and deliberately falsified," id. at 445, and the judge insisted that the issue
was not capable of resolution without revealing the informants' identities, id. at 446.
The court held:
The Government has control of all the evidence bearing on the question. It has
the burden of proof. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 . . .
(1968). The inconclusive showing made requires suppression of the evidence
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It seems, then, that the practical effect of permitting veracity
challenges by a particular federal circuit or jurisdiction depends
largely on the answers the courts give to these collateral questions
such as the burden of proof and the scope of inquiry, as well as the
standards to be applied.
CONCLUSION

It is apparent that while there is a general agreement, at least in
the federal courts, that veracity challenges should be permitted,
there is also substantial divergence of opinion as to the extent to
which such challenges should be allowed and the degree to which
inaccurate warrants should be invalidated. To a certain extent the
disagreement as to the standards to be applied to inaccurate warrants
is due to the lack of consistently applied theory justifying the exclusionary rule, i.e., is the exclusionary rule primarily (or wholly) a
deterrent device or is it utilized to vindicate the integrity of the judicial system?
There is an approach, however, which strikes at least a rough
balance between fourth amendment interests and society's need for
effective law enforcement. This approach would be to utilize a standard (substantially that adopted by the First Circuit in the Belculfine
case) which would necessitate the exclusion of those misstatements
shown to be both intentional and material. As recognized by the
Belculfine and ex rel. Petillo courts, intentional though non-material
misstatements present a slightly different problem, While such
statements should not automatically invalidate a warrant, their existence brings into question the credibility of the affiant. Thus, the
existence of non-material, intentional misstatements should invalidate
a warrant only where they so compromise the credibility of the remaining material statements as to undermine the existence of probable cause. In other words, that the non-material statements have
been falsely sworn to should not go to the admissibility of the remaining material statements but rather, only to the weight accorded them
by the reviewing judge in determining whether there was probable
cause to issue the warrant.
The question left open in Belculfine, however, was how to deal
with negligent or reckless misstatements. Because negligent or reckless statements reflect misfeasance rather than malfeasance, their presence in a warrant is not as serious an imposition on the integrity of
the judicial process. Furthermore, while the existence of the deterrent effect of exclusion is questionable even in case of deliberate mis-
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representation, it is arguably inoperative in instances where negligent
or reckless misstatements are excluded.
Thus, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, perhaps the criminal should
not go free because the constable has blundered. But, where the constable has deliberately lied in order to obtain a search warrant, the
public interest in protecting fourth amendment values argues strongly
in favor of excluding evidence seized thereby.
Maureen Elizabeth Garde

